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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
ROBERT CARL TERRY, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 20040326-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals his convictions on two counts of possession of clandestine 
laboratory precursors, a first degree felony. This Court has pour-over jurisdiction 
pursuant § 78-2a-3(2)G) (West 2004).1 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
L Does defense counsel's decision to forego lesser included offense 
instructions constitute ineffective assistance where those instructions 
would have been inconsistent with defendant's all-or-nothing defense at 
trial? 
Defendant raises this claim both as an ineffective assistance claim and a plain error 
claim. An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the first time on appeal 
Although defendant was also convicted on one count of failure to respond to an 
officer's signal, a third degree felony, and one count of carrying a concealed dangerous 
weapon, a class B misdemeanor, none of defendant's claims on appeal challenge those 
convictions. See Aplt. Br. at 13-31. 
presents a question of law. See State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, % 6, 89 P.3d 162. To establish 
plain error, defendant must show that trial error occurred, that the error should have been 
obvious to the trial court, and that he was prejudiced by that error. See State v. Nelson-
Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, % 16, 94 P.3d 186. 
II.A. Does defendant's ineffective assistance claim that counsel should have 
challenged the jury instruction defining possession fail where the 
instruction is consistent with Utah law? 
II.B. Does defendant's ineffective assistance claim that counsel should have 
challenged the lack of a conspiracy elements instruction fail where 
defendant provides no evidentiary support for his claim that a different 
result was reasonably probable had such an instruction been given? 
ILC. Does defendant's ineffective assistance claim that counsel should have 
challenged the intent instruction fail where the statute upon which he 
relies merely sets out factors a jury may consider in determining 
intent? 
The same standard of review applies to these claims as applies to claim I. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following statutory provisions are attached at Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2 (2002); 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-3 (2002); 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-4 (2002); 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-5 (2002); 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-6 (2002). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information with one count of possession of 
pseudoephedrine, a clandestine laboratory precursor, a first degree felony; one count of 
possession of iodine, a clandestine laboratory precursor, a first degree felony; one count 
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of failure to respond to an officer's signal, a third degree felony; and one count of 
carrying a concealed weapon, a class B misdemeanor (R67-70). After a preliminary 
hearing, defendant was bound over as charged (R47). Following a jury trial, defendant 
was convicted on all counts (R114,120). 
Before sentencing, defendant filed Defendant's Motion and Memorandum in 
Support of Motion to Dismiss or for New Trial (R171-84). The trial court denied 
defendant's motion (R239-47). Defendant then refiled his motion as a motion to arrest 
judgment (R255-66). The trial court again denied defendant's motion (R292-309). 
Defendant then filed a motion to disqualify Judge Michael G. Allphin (R334-40). 
After an evidentiary hearing before the presiding judge, defendant's motion was denied 
(R328-30). Defendant was thereafter sentenced to five years to life on each first degree 
felony count, zero-to-five years on the third degree felony; and six months in jail on the 
misdemeanor (R332,347-49). 
When defendant then filed a motion for new trial, Judge Allphin recused himself 
(R354-55,405). Defendant's case was reassigned (R420-21). His motion for new trial 
was denied (R515-16,527-34). 
Approximately three months later, defendant filed a rule 65B motion asserting that 
his right to appeal had been denied and requesting that he be resentenced (R535-37). The 
trial court granted defendant's motion (R558-59, 560). 
A timely notice of appeal was filed (R565-67). The supreme court transferred the 
matter to this Court for disposition (R577). 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS2 
In early 2001, defendant, a small business owner from Wyoming, purchased a 
Chevrolet Suburban from the Utah Auto Collection, a dealership in Bountiful, Utah. At 
the time, Jeff Archibald was a manager at the dealership. Defendant paid for the 
Suburban with cash (R601:25-26). 
A few weeks later, in mid-March, Archibald ran into defendant at an automotive 
shop in Bountiful (R601:27). Archibald was impressed with the late model SS Camaro 
defendant was driving and asked that defendant take him for a ride (R601:27, 53). 
During the ride, defendant told Archibald that he could earn some extra cash if he knew 
anyone who could sell defendant large quantities of iodine or iodized crystals (R601:29). 
Archibald told defendant that he would see what he could do (R601:29,82,108). 
A few days later, Archibald was playing pool at a local pool hall (R601:30). 
During the game, Archibald asked if anyone knew where he could get some iodine. 
Archibald explained that he had a friend who wanted to "throw a batch" of 
methamphetamine ("meth")—i.e., to cook some—and was short 15 pounds of iodine 
(R601:30,147). Mark Shaffer, a fellow pool player who was also a government 
informant, indicated that he could get some (R601:31,80-81,83, 99-107). 
Within a day or two, Shaffer telephoned Archibald and put him in contact with a 
man named "Jason," who was actually an undercover narcotics agent from the West 
2
 The facts are set forth in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. See State 
v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,12, 10 P.3d 346. 
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Valley Police Department (R601:132-33). Jason told Archibald that he had both iodized 
crystals and pseudoephedrine to sell (R601:31-32,85,115-16,152). Jason recalled that 
Archibald seemed familiar with some of the lingo surrounding the two precursors and 
their connection to meth production. (R601:132-33). 
The initial contact between Jason, Shaffer, and Archibald was followed by a brief 
meeting at a local gas station in which Jason showed Archibald a sample of the precursors 
he had for sale and confirmed that Archibald's customer was serious about buying them 
(R601:86, 119-20). During the meeting, Archibald asked Jason whether Jason had access 
to other forms of iodine in larger quantities (R601120-21). When Shaffer later told 
Archibald that he wanted an ounce of methamphetamine back after everything was done, 
Archibald responded, "No problem" (R601:l 12). 
Archibald then telephoned defendant, who decided to purchase ten pounds of 
iodine and four cases of pseudoephedrine from Jason (R601:33, 83-84). The agreed-upon 
price for iodized crystals would be $300 a pound; the price for the pseudoephedrine was 
$2,200 per case (R601:124.153). The total price for both meth precursors, then, would 
be $11,800 (R601:33,153). Completion of the sale would take place the following 
Wednesday at 8:00 p.m. at the old Five Points Mall in Bountiful (R601:34,36,89,124, 
127,153). 
Shortly before 8:00 p.m. on that Wednesday, Archibald met defendant at the 
Bountiful Bubble Swimming Pool (R601:35,166). Defendant asked Archibald where the 
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sale was to take place and then gave Archibald two clear plastic packages of money 
(R601:35-36). Archibald then drove over to the Five Points Mall (R601:36). 
When Archibald arrived, Shaffer and Jason were waiting for him (R601:90). 
Archibald handed Jason the plastic packages defendant had provided him (R601:91,127). 
After Jason finished counting the money, he took Archibald to the back of the vehicle 
where the chemicals were located (R601:91-92,128). Archibald told Jason that his friend 
was close by and that Archibald wanted to take the chemicals over to him and then return 
the cooler later (R601:129). Archibald also indicated that his friend was interested in 
buying kegs of iodine from Jason every other week or so (R601:129). At that point, Jason 
gave the signal for Archibald to be arrested (R601:37-38,129). 
Shortly after the scene was cleared of people, an agent in an unmarked police 
car—who had been told that a person from Wyoming was the actual buyer in the 
case—observed defendant driving his Wyoming-registered silver Camaro slowly by the 
Five Points Mall sale sight (R601:184). As the agent followed defendant's Camaro, the 
agent requested that marked police vehicles assist him in executing a stop on it 
(R601:171,184). Four marked police cars soon joined the agent and, turning on their 
overhead emergency lights, attempted to stop the Camaro (R601:172-73,186). When the 
Camaro slowed down, the officers in the marked police cars stopped their vehicles and 
ordered defendant to come to a complete stop (R601:173). Instead, defendant leaned out 
the driver's side window, asked the officers what was going on, "punched the gas and just 
drove down the street quickly" (R601:174-76,186). 
6 
Six blocks later, defendant finally pulled off to the side of the road and stopped 
(R601:176). The gas tank in defendant's car registered empty (R601:194). When asked 
why he decided to stop, defendant "said something about because of the number of police 
that he saw behind him" (R601:178). 
After defendant was arrested, officers searched both him and his Camaro 
(R601:187-91). On defendant's person, officers found $2,204 in cash (R601:191). On 
the front passenger seat of defendant's car, officers found a radio frequency detector 
(R601:189-90, 194). On the back seat, they found a case containing a .45 caliber semi-
automatic handgun and two loaded magazines, one of which was in the gun (R601:190-
91). Finally, under the front passenger seat, officers found a sack of sharp spikes used to 
deflate tires (R601:188). At the time of the search, the sack seemed caught under the 
seat, with one of the spikes caught in the carpet (R601:192). 
Defendant initially denied knowing Archibald when asked by police (R601:201, 
203). Later, however, defendant admitted not only that he knew Archibald but that he 
had met Archibald at the Bubble earlier that evening and had given Archibald some 
money during that meeting (R601:201,203). Defendant claimed that the money was for a 
down payment on a vehicle (R601:201,203). 
Shortly thereafter, defendant's properties in Wyoming were searched (R601:206). 
At defendant's home, officers found numerous chemicals associated with the manufacture 
of methamphetamine, including hydrogen peroxide, tincture iodine, acetone, Toluol, 
Toluylene, muriatic acid, and red devil lye (R601:210-13,217-18). Officers also found 
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surveillance equipment around the home, including a camera deployed in a tree in 
defendant's yard (R601:209). 
Archibald entered into a plea agreement with the State shortly before defendant's 
trial (R601:38, 40, 49). In exchange for Archibald's testimony against defendant, 
Archibald's original second-degree felony charges of possession of a controlled substance 
precursor were reduced to third degree felonies (R601:40). In addition, upon successful 
completion of probation, Archibald could apply to have the felony convictions reduced to 
misdemeanors (R601:40). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Issue I. Defendant claims that reversible error occurred in his case because the 
jury was not instructed on lesser included offenses of possession of a clandestine 
laboratory precursor. Defendant raises his claim both as an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim and as a plain error claim. 
To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must show both that 
his counsel performed deficiently and that he was prejudiced by counsel's deficient 
performance. To demonstrate the first prong of the test, defendant must overcome the 
presumption that, under the circumstances, counsel's actions may be considered sound 
trial strategy. If any sound strategic basis exists for counsel's action, defendant's 
ineffective assistance claim fails. 
To establish plain error, defendant must show that an error occurred, that the error 
should have been obvious to the trial court, and that the error was prejudicial. This Court, 
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however, will not consider a plain error claim where defense counsel strategically chose 
not to raise the issue below or otherwise led the trial court into the alleged error. 
In this case, the defense at trial was that defendant was completely innocent of the 
possession charges. Lesser included offense instructions would have been inconsistent 
with this all-or-nothing defense. Defense counsel, therefore, had a sound strategic reason 
for not requesting such instructions. Under such circumstances, both defendant's 
ineffective assistance and his plain error claims fail. 
Issue ILA. Defendant claims that his counsel was ineffective for failing to 
challenge the jury instruction defining possession in the context of his possession charges. 
Defendant raises his claim both as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim and as a 
plain error claim. 
Because defendant affirmatively approved of the jury instruction below, defendant 
has waived any plain error challenge to the instruction on appeal. Defendant's ineffective 
assistance claim fails because defendant cannot show deficient performance where the 
instruction was consistent with Utah law. 
Issue ILB. Defendant claims that his counsel was ineffective for failing to 
request a jury instruction defining the elements of conspiracy where one of the theories 
upon which his possession charges rested was that he had "conspired with or aided 
another to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation." Defendant raises his claim both 
as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim and as a plain error claim. 
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As previously stated, to establish ineffective assistance, defendant must show both 
that his counsel performed deficiently and that he was prejudiced by that deficient 
performance. However, if defendant has not established that he was prejudiced by 
counsel's performance, this Court need not decide whether counsel's performance was 
deficient. Failure to establish prejudice also defeats any plain error claim because it too 
requires a showing of prejudice. 
In this case, defendant's claims fail because he has not demonstrated prejudice. 
Specifically, defendant provides no evidentiary support for his claim that he was 
prejudiced by the lack of a conspiracy elements instruction. Thus, his claim of prejudice 
is purely speculative. Such speculation does not support either an ineffective assistance 
or a plain error claim. 
Issue II.C. Defendant claims that his counsel was ineffective for failing to request 
an additional jury instruction on intent in connection with his possession charges. 
Defendant contends that, because the instructions did not include circumstances identified 
by statute "under which the jury, as the trier of fact, may infer [intent]," the instructions 
were incomplete and inaccurate. Defendant raises his claim both as an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim and as a plain error claim. 
Because defendant affirmatively approved of the intent instructions below, 
defendant waived any plain error challenge to those instructions. Defendant's 
ineffectiveness claim fails because nothing in the cited statute—which merely sets forth a 
non-exclusive list of circumstances under which a jury may infer an intent to engage in a 
10 
clandestine laboratory—mandates that it be given as an instruction in all cases where 
intent to engage in a clandestine laboratory is an element. 
ARGUMENT 
L DEFENSE COUNSEL'S DECISION TO FOREGO LESSER 
INCLUDED OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS DID NOT CONSTITUTE 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE WHERE SUCH INSTRUCTIONS 
WOULD HAVE BEEN INCONSISTENT WITH DEFENDANT'S 
ALL-OR-NOTHING DEFENSE AT TRIAL 
Defendant claims that his convictions for possession of clandestine laboratory 
precursors must be reversed. Aplt. Br. at 13-22. Specifically, defendant asserts that 
"[t]rial counsel's failure to request jury instructions on the lesser included offenses of 
possession of a controlled substance precursor . . . fell below an objective standard of 
reasonable professional judgment," and that he was prejudiced by counsel's failure. Aplt. 
Br. at 15, 20. "In addition," defendant claims, "the trial court committed plain error by 
failing to charge the jury with respect to the aforementioned lesser included offenses." 
Aplt. Br. at 20. Defendant's claims fail, first, because he has not shown that he had a 
right to lesser included offense instructions in this case. Defendant's claims fail, second, 
because he has not overcome the presumption that counsel's decision to forego such 
instructions, even if available, was sound trial strategy. 
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must demonstrate both 
that "counsel's performance was deficient, in that it fell below an objective standard of 
reasonable professional judgement," and that "counsel's deficient performance was 
prejudicial - i.e., that it affected the outcome of the case." State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 
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76, If 19, 12 P.3d 92 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984)); see 
also State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1998) (citations omitted). To prevail on the 
first prong of this test, "'[defendant must identify specific acts or omissions 
demonstrating that counsel's representation failed to meet an objective standard of 
reasonableness.5" Moench v. State, 2004 UT App 57, \ 21, 88 P.3d 353 (quoting Taylor v. 
Warden, 905 P.2d 277, 282 (Utah 1995)) (additional citations and quotation marks 
omitted). 
To establish plain error, defendant must show '"(i) An error exists; (ii) the error 
should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error was harmful, i.e., absent the 
error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the [defendant]."' 
State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, If 16, 94 P.3d 186, 497 Utah Adv. Rep. 23 
(quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993)). 
A. Defendant's claims fail because defendant has not shown that he 
had a right to lesser included offense instructions in this case. 
Defendant's claims rest on the premise that, had they been requested, the trial court 
would have been required to give lesser included offense instructions in this case. See 
Aplt. Br. at 16-19. Because defendant provides no factual support for his premise, his 
ineffective assistance and plain error claims based on that premise fail 
Under well-established law, lesser included offense instruction requested by a 
defendant must be given if: 
(1) the two offenses are related because some of their statutory 
elements overlap, and the evidence at trial of the grater offense 
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involves proof of some or all of those overlapping elements; and 
(2) the evidence provides a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the 
defendant of the offense charged and convicting the defendant of the 
lesser-included offense. 
State v. Kell, 2002 UT 106,123, 61 P.3d 1019; see also State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 
157-59 (Utah 1983). 
Consequently, the propriety of a lesser included offense instruction in any given 
case depends on the evidence presented at trial. See State v. Kruger, 2000 UT 60, f^ 12, 6 
P.3d 1116 ("When a lesser included instruction is requested by the defendant, the trial 
court must apply an 'evidence-based' standard to decide whether the instruction is 
appropriate."). 
Here, neither defendant's Statement of Facts nor his argument provides any 
statement of the evidence produced at trial. See Aplt. Br. at 6-8, 13-22. Consequently, 
defendant provides no evidentiary support for his assertion that, if requested, lesser 
included offense instructions would have been appropriate here. Cf. Utah R. App. P. 
24(a)(9) (providing that appellant's brief "shall contain . . . citations to the authorities, 
statutes, and parts of the record relied on") (emphasis added); see also State v. Gomez, 
2002 UT 120, \ 20, 63 P.3d 72 (reiterating that "a reviewing court. . . is not simply a 
depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research") 
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted); State v. Garner, 2002 UT App 234, f^ 12, 
52 P.3d 467 (stating that, "[w]hen a party fails to offer any meaningful analysis, [the 
Court will] decline to reach the merits"). 
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Absent a showing that this was an appropriate case for lesser included offense 
instructions, defendant has failed to "'identify specific acts or omissions demonstrating 
that counsel's representation failed to meet an objective standard of reasonableness.5" 
Moench, 2004 UT App 57,121 (citations omitted). Thus, defendant has failed to meet 
the first prong of the Stricklandtest defining ineffective assistance of counsel. See, e.g., 
State v. Kelley, 2000 UT 41, f^ 26, 1 P.3d 546 ("Failure to raise futile objections does not 
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel."). 
Similarly, absent a showing that lesser included instructions, if requested, would 
have been mandated, defendant cannot demonstrate error, let alone obvious error, in the 
trial court's failure to sua sponte give them. See Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, 
|^ 16 (holding that defendant must show obvious error to prevail on plain error claim). 
Consequently, defendant's ineffective assistance and plain error claims based on 
the premise that lesser included offense instructions were required in this case fail. 
B. Alternatively, defendant's ineffective assistance claim fails 
because, given defendant's "all or nothing" defense, counsel had 
strategic reasons for not requesting lesser included offense 
instructions. 
Assuming arguendo that lesser included offense instructions were available here, 
defendant's ineffectiveness claim nonetheless fails because defendant cannot show that 
his counsel performed deficiently in not requesting such instructions. 
As discussed above, to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, 
defendant must show both that his counsel "rendered deficient performance which fell 
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below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment" and that "counsel's 
deficient performance prejudiced him." Chacon, 962 P.2d at 50 (citations omitted); see 
also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. To demonstrate the first prong of that test, defendant 
must "rebut the strong presumption that under the circumstances, the challenged action 
might be considered sound trial strategy." Litherland, 2000 UT 76, \ 19 (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted). This Court "will not question such [action] unless 
there is no reasonable basis supporting [it]." State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638, 644 (Utah 
1996) (quoting Taylor v. Warden, 905 P.2d 277, 282 (Utah 1995)) (emphasis added). 
A claim that trial counsel performed deficiently, therefore, must rest on more than 
mere failure to object when counsel had a basis to do so. Defendant must also show that 
counsel's decision not to object had "no reasonable basis supporting [it]." Crosby, 927 
P.2d at 644 (citation omitted). Seef e.g., State v. Pecht, 2002 UT 41, ffi[ 40-44, 48 P.3d 
931 (holding failure to object to evidence of defendant's prior incarcerations was not 
deficient performance where omission was part of trial strategy); State v. Bullock, 791 
P.2d 155, 159-60 (Utah 1989) (holding failure to object to arguably inadmissible 
testimony was not deficient performance where trial strategy was to "mount[] an effective 
attack on [the witness's] motives and methods," and "present[] countervailing testimony" 
so as to "attack the quality of the State's evidence"); State v. Bloomfield, 2003 UT App 3, 
f 31, 63 P.3d 110 (holding failure to object to admission of evidence offered without 
adequate foundation was not deficient performance where counsel "used it as part of his 
trial strategy"); State v. Villarreal, 857 P.2d 949, 955-56 (Utah App. 1993) (holding 
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failure to object to arguably inadmissible evidence was not deficient performance where 
"counsel apparently elected not to object... in order to pursue the trail strategy of 
attacking the [State's] investigation"), affdby 889 P.2d 419, 427 (Utah 1995). 
Here, defendant's deficient performance claim rests solely on his contention that, 
because lesser included offense instructions were supported by the evidence here, defense 
counsel performed deficiently in not requesting them. See Aplt. Br. at 13-20. 
However, numerous tactical reasons explain why counsel may chose to forego 
such instructions. For example, counsel "may choose not to request instructions on lesser 
included offenses as a matter of trial strategy, . . . in the belief that he can defeat the 
greater charge, but might not be able to defeat a lesser included offense." State v. Howell, 
649 P.2d 91, 94 (Utah 1982) ("Indeed, a defendant for that reason may even oppose 
instructions on lesser included offenses . . . in the hope of escaping all criminal 
liability."). 
Alternatively, counsel may reasonably forego requesting lesser included offense 
instructions because such instructions are inconsistent with the "all or nothing" defense 
presented at trial. See, e.g., State v. Hall, 946 P.2d 712, 723 (Utah App. 1997) (rejecting 
ineffective assistance claim alleging failure to request lesser included offense instructions 
where "counsel's request for instructions on lesser included offenses would have been 
inconsistent with [trial strategy]"); State v. Perry, 899 P.2d 1232, 1241 (Utah App. 1995) 
(same). 
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Defendant himself may well choose such an all-or-nothing strategy and instruct 
defense counsel not to request lesser included offense instructions." See State v. Valdez, 
19 Utah 2d 426, 428, 432 P.2d 53, 54 (1967) ("Sometimes as a matter of trial strategy a 
defendant desires to have his case submitted to the jury upon the basis of the greater 
offense only and to risk 'all or nothing' on the outcome."); 
In this case, the defense strategy was to present an "all or nothing" defense 
(R601:22-23 (asserting in opening statement that the jury would find the State's two main 
witnesses "totally unbelievable" and that the case against his client "is smoke and 
mirrors"); R601:229 (arguing in closing argument that the State's case against defendant 
is "just smoke and mirrors"); R.601:240 (arguing in closing argument that "the only thing 
you have to link [defendant] to any of that in this case is these two individuals, which 
apparently counsel is willing to concede, didn't testify truthfully here")). 
Therefore, counsel's strategy was not that, if defendant was guilty of any crime, it 
was only a lesser included one. Rather, counsel's strategy was to deny defendant's 
involvement in any criminal activity at all. Such a defense may well be a sound one. See 
Howell, 649 P.2d at 94; Valdez, 432 P.2d at 54. 
Moreover, because lesser included offense instructions would have been 
inconsistent with that strategy, counsel's decision to forego such instructions was also 
sound. See Hall, 946 P.2d at 723 (rejecting ineffective assistance claim where "[djefense 
counsel argued throughout trial that A.C. was lying about the alleged abuse"); Perry, 899 
P.2d at 1241 (rejecting ineffective assistance claim where "[t]rial counsel's strategy 
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below was to claim misidentification, or alternatively, to demonstrate that the State had 
failed to show any aggravation, not that defendant was involved in a lesser crime of 
aggravated assault"). 
Consequently, defendant cannot demonstrate that counsel performed deficiently in 
making that decision. See Crosby, 927 P.2d at 644 (holding court will not question 
counsel's strategic decisions "unless there is no reasonable basis supporting them") 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim therefore fails. See Chacon, 
962 P.2d at 50; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 
C. Trial counsel's sound strategic reason for foregoing lesser 
included offense instructions defeats defendant's plain error 
claim. 
Because defendant's counsel had a sound strategic reason for not requesting lesser 
included offense instructions, this Court should not reach defendant's plain error claim. 
First, established law suggests that a trial court never commits plain error in not 
sua sponte giving lesser included offense instructions. See, e.g., State v. Mitchell, 3 Utah 
2d 70, 75, 278 P.2d 618, 621 (1955) (rejecting prior dicta suggesting that "'[i]t [is] the 
duty of the court to charge upon the subject, whether requested so to do or not'") (citation 
omitted); State v. Whiteman, 2000 UT App 283 (unpublished, attached at Addendum B) 
("It is long settled that a defendant has a choice whether to seek a lesser-included 
instruction, and the court has no independent duty to give such an instruction if not 
requested."). Any other result, the courts explain, would "allow one to sit by and 
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deliberately refuse to request instructions as to lesser offenses, with positive assurance of 
another trial if his client be convicted of the charge against him." Mitchell, 278 P.2d at 
621; see also Valdez, 432 P.2d at 54 (holding defendant "cannot thus elect to make no 
request as to lesser included offense, with a reservation in mind that if he is convicted he 
can claim error and obtain a new trial"); Whiteman, 2000 UT App 283 ("[W]ere we to 
find this strategic choice to fall under the plain error or manifest injustice doctrines, 
defendants in all cases could gamble that the jury would acquit, then appeal the failure to 
instruct as a manifest injustice should they lose."); see also Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 32 
("It is generally inappropriate for a trial court to interfere with counsel's conscious 
choices."). 
To the extent these cases suggest a blanket rule, defendant's plain error challenge 
to the absence of lesser included offense instructions fails. Even if they do not suggest 
such a blanket rule, defendant's plain error claim fails under traditional invited error 
analysis. 
To establish plain error, defendant must show that an error occurred, that it should 
have been obvious to the trial court, and that the error was prejudicial. See Nelson-
Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, f^ 16. However, this Court "will decline to consider a 
defendant's plain-error arguments if the alleged errors reasonably resulted from defense 
counsel's 'conscious decision to refrain from objecting.'" Hall, 946 P.2d at 716 (quoting 
State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 158-59 (Utah 1989)). 
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As discussed above, see pp. 14-18 supra, the lack of lesser included offense 
instructions "reasonably resulted from defense counsel's 'conscious decision to refrain 
from [requesting them]."' Id. (citation omitted). Thus, this court should "decline to 
consider . . . defendant's plain-error argument" here. Id. 
ILA. DEFENDANT'S INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE CHALLENGE TO 
THE JURY INSTRUCTION DEFINING POSSESSION FAILS 
BECAUSE THE INSTRUCTION IS CONSISTENT WITH UTAH 
LAW 
Defendant claims that his trial counsel "rendered ineffective assistance of counsel 
by failing to object to Instruction No. 33, which was utilized to instruction the jury 
concerning constructive possession." Aplt. Br. at 23 (footnote omitted). Defendant 
claims the instruction was erroneous because, "[according to the evidence presented in 
the instant case," the State "could not have proven that Mr. Terry constructively 
possessed the controlled substance precursors." Aplt. Br. at 24.3 
To the extent defendant's claim challenges the jury instruction defining 
constructive possession, defendant's claim fails because the instruction is consistent with 
Utah law. To the extent defendant's claim is a sufficiency of the evidence claim, 
defendant's claim fails because defendant has not marshaled the evidence supporting a 
3Defendant asks this Court to also review this claim for plain error. See Aplt. Br. 
at 25. However, because defendant affirmatively approved of this instruction at trial 
(R601:68), he waived any plain error challenge to that instruction on appeal. See State v. 
Finder, 2005 UT 15, \ 62, 114 P.3d 551 ("A jury instruction may not be assigned as error, 
even if such instruction would otherwise constitute manifest injustice, 'if counsel, either 
by statement or act, affirmatively represented to the court that he or she had no objection 
to the jury instruction.'") (quoting State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, \ 54, 70 P.3d 111). 
20 
finding that defendant, either as a party to the offense or as a co-conspirator, 
constructively possessed the precursors. 
1. Because the jury instruction defining "constructive possession" 
was consistent with Utah law, defendant's ineffective assistance 
claim based on that instruction fails. 
Defendant claims that his counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the 
definition of "constructive possession" contained in Jury Instruction 33. Aplt. Br. at 23. 
Defendant contends that counsel should have objected to the instruction because it 
"fail[ed] to accurately instruct the jury on the law applicable to the facts of this case." Id. 
at 25. 
In support of his claim, defendant asserts that, "[according to Utah law, to prove 
constructive possession there must be a 'sufficient nexus5 between the accused and the 
controlled substance precursors to permit an inference that the accused had both the 
power and the intent to exercise dominion and control over the controlled substance 
precursors." Aplt. Br. at 23 (citing State v. Layman, 1999 UT 79, ^ 13, 985 P.2d 911). 
Thus, "to show constructive possession in the instant case, the State had to prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the controlled substance precursors 'were subject to the 
defendant's dominion and control and that the defendant had the intent to exercise that 
control.'" Id. at 23-24 (quoting Layman, 1999 UT 79, \ 16). 
The State does not quarrel with defendant's statement of the law concerning 
constructive possession. However, defendant's claim nonetheless fails because the jury 
instruction given here was consistent with that law. 
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In this case, instruction 33 defined "possession" for purposes of defendant's drug 
charges. That instruction, which included a definition of constructive possession, 
provided: 
"Possession" The definition of possession does not require 
that a person be shown to have individually possessed a controlled 
substance precursor. Rather, it is sufficient if it is shown that the 
person jointly participated with one or more persons in the 
possession of a controlled substance precursor with knowledge that 
the activity was occurring, or the controlled substance precursor is 
found in a place or under circumstances indicating that the person 
had the ability and the intent to exercise dominion and control over 
it. 
(R100) (emphasis added). 
This definition of "possession" is identical to the definition of "possession" found 
in the Clandestine Drug Lab Act. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37d-3(2) (2002) (providing 
that, [u]nless otherwise specified, the definitions in Section 58-37-2 also apply to this 
chapter"); 58-37-2(dd) (2002) (defining possession). 
Moreover, the definition of "constructive possession" contained in the italicized 
part of the instruction is identical to the definition of "constructive possession" outlined in 
defendant's brief. Compare R100 with Aplt. Br. at 23-24. 
Consequently, defendant's claim that instruction 33 was erroneous, and that his 
counsel was therefore ineffective in not challenging it, fails. See State v. Kelley, 2000 
UT 41, Tf 26, 1 P.3d 546 ("Failure to raise futile objections does not constitute ineffective 
assistance of counsel."). 
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2. Any insufficiency of the evidence challenge hinted in defendant's 
brief fails where defendant has not marshaled the evidence 
supporting the jury's verdict. 
As part of his argument challenging the correctness of instruction 33, defendant 
contends that the instruction was erroneous because, "[according to the evidence 
presented in the instant case/' the State "could not have proven that Mr. Terry 
constructively possessed the controlled substance precursors." Aplt. Br. at 24. To the 
extent defendant attempts to raise a sufficiency of the evidence claim, this Court should 
reject it 
"In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, the burden on the defendant is 
heavy. Defendant must marshal all evidence supporting the jury's verdict and must then 
show how this marshaled evidence is insufficient to support the verdict even when 
viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict." State v. Lemons, 844 P.2d 378, 381 
(Utah App. 1992) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also State v. 
Vessey, 967 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah App. 1998); State v. Scheel, 823 P.2d 470, 472 (Utah 
App. 1991). 
"[T]o properly discharge [this] duty . . . , the challenger must present, in 
comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial 
which supports the very findings the [defendant] resists." State v. Coonce, 2001 UT App 
355, Tf 6, 36 P.3d 533 (citing West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 
(Utah App. 1991)). "After constructing this magnificent array of supporting evidence, the 
23 
challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence." Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d at 
1315. 
Here, defendant marshals none of the evidence supporting the jury's verdicts. 
Defendant's statement of facts contains no summary of or citation to the evidence elicited 
at trial. See Aplt. Br. at 6-8. And, although defendant's argument addressing his 
"constructive possession" claim contains two citations to the evidence produced at trial, 
those citations appear only as parenthetical support for defendant's conclusory statement 
that, "[according to the evidence presented in the instant case, no one but the police took 
possession, either actual or constructive, of the controlled substance precursors." Aplt. 
Br. at 24 (citing R601:37-38, 129-30). 
Defendant's failure to marshal the evidence supporting the jury's verdict defeats 
any sufficiency of the evidence claim he attempts to raise. 
ILB. DEFENDANT'S INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE CHALLENGE TO 
THE LACK OF A CONSPIRACY ELEMENTS INSTRUCTION 
FAILS WHERE DEFENDANT PROVIDES NO EVIDENTIARY 
SUPPORT FOR HIS CLAIM THAT A DIFFERENT RESULT WAS 
REASONABLY PROBABLE HAD SUCH AN INSTRUCTION BEEN 
GIVEN 
Defendant claims that his counsel was ineffective in "fail[ing] to request a jury 
instruction that accurately defined the conspiracy element [of the possession charges]." 
Aplt. Br. at 26. Specifically, defendant claims that, because one of the theories upon 
which the jury was instructed concerning the possession charges was that defendant 
'"[c]onspired with or aided another to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation,'" the 
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jury should have been instructed as to the statutory definition of conspiracy "as set forth 
in Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-201." Aplt. Br. at 25-26. Because defendant has not shown 
that he was prejudiced by any missing conspiracy instruction, however, defendant's claim 
fails.4 
As previously stated, to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must 
demonstrate both that "counsel's performance was deficient, in that it fell below an 
objective standard of reasonable professional judgement," and that "counsel's deficient 
performance was prejudicial ~ i.e., that it affected the outcome of the case." State v. 
Litherland, 2000 UT 76, \ 19, 12 P.3d 92 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
687-88(1984)). 
However, "it is not necessary for [this Court] 'to address both components of the 
inquiry if [defendant] makes an insufficient showing on one.'" Parsons v. Barnes, 871 
P.2d 516, 523 (Utah 1994) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697); see also State v. Wright, 
2004 UT App 102, Tf 9, 90 P.3d 644. "When it is 'easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness 
claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice,'" this Court "will do so without 
4Defendant also raises this claim under the plain error doctrine. However, because 
defendant has not established the prejudice necessary to prevail on his ineffective 
assistance claim, he also has not established the prejudice necessary to prevail on his plain 
error claim. See State v. McCloud, 2005 UT App 466, \ 16, P.3d (holding that 
because both ineffective assistance and plain error claims "require [defendant] to show 
that he was prejudiced," the inability to show prejudice as to one claim defeats the other); 
State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah App. 1992) (holding that "[w]hen defendant 
raises the issues of both plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel, a common 
standard is applicable," and the inability to show prejudice for one claim defeats the 
other) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
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addressing whether counsel's performance was professionally reasonable." Parsons, 871 
P.2d at 523 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697); see also Wright, 2004 UT App 102, lj 9. 
With respect to the second Stricklandprong, defendant must show that absent 
counsel's deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability of a more favorable 
result. See State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1998). Such a showing must be based 
on a "demonstrable reality and not a speculative matter." Id. (citation and quotation 
marks omitted). Thus, "[i]t is not enough to show that the alleged errors had some 
conceivable effect on the outcome." Wright, 2004 UT App 102,115, 90 P.3d 644; see 
also State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 406 (Utah 1986). Rather, defendant "must 
affirmatively show that there is a 'reasonable probability' that, but for counsel's errors, 
the result would have been different." State v. Villarreal, 857 P.2d 949, 954 (Utah App. 
1993), aff'd, 889 P.2d 419 (Utah 1995). "[An] invitation to speculate cannot substitute 
for proof of prejudice." State v. Arguelles, 921 P.2d 439, 441 (Utah 1996) (rejecting 
ineffective assistance claim based on defendant's decision not to testify where "neither 
the record nor Arguelles' brief indicates what his testimony would have been"). 
In this case, defendant's claim of prejudice is purely speculative. Although he 
asserts that "the outcome would have been different" if a conspiracy instruction had been 
given, defendant provides no evidentiary support for that assertion. See Aplt. Br. at 25-
28. Defendant's Statement of Facts contains no description of the evidence produced at 
his trial. See Aplt. Br. at 6-8. Nor does the argument section of his brief discussing this 
issue. See Aplt. Br. at 25-28. 
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Absent any discussion of the evidence produced at trial, defendant cannot—as he 
must to prevail on an ineffective assistance claim—"affirmatively show that there is a 
'reasonable probability' that, but for [the lack of a conspiracy instruction], the result 
would have been different." Villarreal, 857 P.2d at 954. 
Consequently, defendant's ineffective assistance claim fails.5 
II.C. DEFENDANT'S INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE CHALLENGE TO 
THE INTENT INSTRUCTION FAILS WHERE THE STATUTE 
UPON WHICH HE RELIES MERELY IDENTIFIES FACTORS A 
JURY MAY CONSIDER IN DETERMINING INTENT 
Defendant claims that his counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the jury 
instructions defining the intent element of his clandestine laboratory operation offenses. 
5As a sub-part of his claim, defendant contends that his counsel should also have 
requested a special verdict form "so that [defendant] . . . could determine which variation 
the jury relied upon in the course of convicting him of Clandestine Laboratory Precursors 
and/or Equipment." Aplt. Br. at 26. 
In support of this contention, defendant cites State v. Hopkins, 1999 UT 98, 989 
P.2d 1065. See Aplt. Br. at 19. However, Hopkins was convicted of both (1) operating a 
clandestine methamphetamine laboratory based on a jury instruction that listed multiple 
theories upon which Hopkins could be convicted, including a theory based on his 
possession of a controlled substance precursor, and (2) possession of that same controlled 
substance precursor. Hopkins, 1999 UT 98, fflj 1, 27. The State conceded and the 
supreme court held that, "because no special verdict form was employed, it is possible the 
jury relied on [the possession of a controlled substance precursor in finding Hopkins 
guilty of the first crime], which includes all the elements for conviction of possession of a 
controlled substance precursor." Id. \ 27. Under such circumstances, the court agreed 
with the State "that Hopkins is entitled to reversal of his conviction for [the lesser crime 
of] possession of a controlled substance precursor." Id. 
In this case, defendant was not convicted both of a greater crime and a potentially 
lesser included one. Thus, Hopkins is inapposite. 
In any case, because defendant has not addressed the evidence produced at his 
trial, defendant also has not shown "a reasonable probability of a more favorable result" 
had a special verdict form been used. Chacon, 962 P.2d at 50. 
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See Aplt. Br. at 28-30. Defendant contends that, because the instructions did not include 
"circumstances" identified by statute "under which the jury, as the trier of fact, may infer 
[intent]," the instructions were "incomplete and thereby [an] inaccurate statement of the 
elements and relevant law." Id. at 29. Because defendant has not shown that the jury was 
improperly instructed on the issue of intent, however, defendant's claim lacks merit.6 
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must demonstrate both 
that "counsel's performance was deficient, in that it fell below an objective standard of 
reasonable professional judgement," and that "counsel's deficient performance was 
prejudicial — i.e., that it affected the outcome of the case." State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 
76, H 19, 12 P.3d 92 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984)). To 
prevail on the first prong of this test, "'[defendant must identify specific acts or 
omissions demonstrating that counsel's representation failed to meet an objective 
standard of reasonableness.'" Moench v. State, 2004 UT App 57, % 21, 88 P.3d 353 
(quoting Taylor v. Warden, 905 P.2d 277, 282 (Utah 1995)) (additional citations and 
quotation marks omitted). Absent such a showing, counsel is presumed to have 
performed effectively. See State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, \ 19, 12 P.3d 92. 
6Defendant asks this Court to also review this claim for plain error. See Aplt. Br. 
at 25. However, because defendant did not object to the relevant jury instructions on this 
basis below (R601:63-67, 70), he waived any plain error challenge to those instructions 
on appeal. See State v. Finder, 2005 UT 15, \ 62, 114 P.3d 551 ("A jury instruction may 
not be assigned as error, even if such instruction would otherwise constitute manifest 
injustice, ' if counsel, either by statement or act, affirmatively represented to the court that 
he or she had no objection to the jury instruction.'") (quoting State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 
22, If 54, 70 P.3d 111). 
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"[T]he general rule is that an accurate instruction upon the basic elements of an 
offense is essential.'5' State v. Pedersen, 2005 UT App 98, f 4, 110 P.3d 164 
(memorandum decision) (quoting State v. Pearson, 1999 UT App 220, |12, 985 P.2d 919) 
(additional quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, "'[wjhen instructing the jury on 
the elements of the offense, the trial court must specifically instruct the jury regarding the 
culpable mental state required to commit the crime.'" Id. (quoting American Fort v. Carr, 
970 P.2d 717, 720 (Utah App. 1998)) (additional quotation marks and citation omitted). 
In this case, jury instructions 28 and 29 set forth the elements that the State had to 
prove before the jury could convict defendant of possession of clandestine laboratory 
precursors (R91-94). Under those instructions, the jury could only convict defendant if 
they found that, "as a party," defendant "[k]nowingly or intentionally . . . [p]ossessed a 
controlled substance precursor with the intent to engage in a clandestine laboratory 
operation; AND/OR [c]onspired with or aided another to engage in a clandestine 
laboratory operation" (R91-94). Jury instruction 35 then defined when a person engages 
in conduct intentionally and when he engages in conduct knowingly (R102). 
Jury instructions 28 and 29 were consistent with the intent required for the crime 
under Utah Code Ann. § 57-37d-4 (1) (2002). Jury instruction 35 was consistent with the 
statutory definitions of "intentionally" and "knowingly" contained in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-2-103(1) and (2) (1999). These instructions on their face, therefore, meet the 
requirements ofPedersen. See Pederson, 2005 UT App 98,14. 
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Notwithstanding, defendant claims that these instructions were "incomplete and 
thereby inaccurate" because they failed to include the language set forth in Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37d-6, which identifies a non-exclusive set of circumstances from which 
"'[t]he trier of fact may infer that the defendant intended to engage in a clandestine 
laboratory operation."5 Aplt. Br. at 29 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-6 (2002)) 
(emphasis added).7 Therefore, defendant claims, his counsel performed deficiently in not 
requesting an additional intent instruction consistent with section 58-37d-6. Id. 
However, nothing in section 58-37d-6 requires that it be given as an instruction 
every time a defendant's crime includes as an element the intent to engage in a 
clandestine laboratory operation. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-6. 
In fact, the plain language of the statute—which uses the permissive term "may" 
rather than the mandatory term "shall"—reflects the absence of such a requirement. See 
State v. Burns, 2000 UT 56, ^ 25, 4 P.3d 795 ("[The] primary goal in interpreting statutes 
is to give effect to the legislative intent, as evidenced by the plain language, in light of the 
7Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-6(2002) provides: 
The trier of fact may infer that the defendant intended to 
engage in a clandestine laboratory operation if the defendant: 
(1) is in illegal possession of a controlled substance 
precursor; or 
(2) illegally possesses or attempts to illegally possess a 
controlled substance precursor and is in possession of any one of the 
following pieces of equipment: 
(a) glass reaction vessel; 
(b) separatory funnel; 
(c) glass condeser; 
(d) analytical balance; or 
(e) heating mantle. 
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purpose the statute was meant to achieve."); State v. Coonce, 2001 UT App 355, \ 9, 36 
P.3d 533 ("[Statutory term[s] should be interpreted and applied according to [their] 
usually accepted meaning, where the ordinary meaning of the term[s] results in an 
application that is neither unreasonably confused, inoperable, nor in blatant contradiction 
of the express purpose of the statute."); see also State v. Wallace, 2005 UT App 434, | 
18, 536 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 ("Utah courts have long interpreted the word 'may' as 
permissive, not restrictive."); State v. Madsen, 2002 UT App 345, ffif 14-15, 57 P.3d 1134 
(interpreting statute providing that '"[pjrior to the imposition of any sentence, the court 
may . . . continue the date for the imposition of sentence . . . for the purpose of obtaining a 
presentence investigation report'"; holding that "[u]se of the permissive term 'may' 
plainly indicates that the trial court is not required to continue sentencing to obtain a 
presence investigation report" but rather merely has discretion to do so). 
Moreover, defendant cites no authority requiring that such an instruction be given 
in all cases despite the statute's permissive language. See Aplt. Br. at 28-30. 
As a consequence, defendant has not demonstrated that the intent instructions 
given were incomplete or inaccurate, as he now claims. See Aplt. Br. at 29. And, 
because defendant has not shown that the intent instructions were incomplete or 
inaccurate, defendant also has not shown that his counsel performed deficiently in not 
objecting to them. See Moench, 2004 UT App 57, If 21 (holding that, to establish 
deficient performance, "'[defendant must identify specific acts or omissions 
31 
demonstrating that counsel's representation failed to meet an objective standard of 
reasonableness.'") (citation omitted). 
Consequently, defendant's ineffective assistance claim fails. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State asks this Court to affirm defendant's 
convictions. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED (f November 2005. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
KAREN A. KLUCZNlK 
Assistant Attorney General 
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(1) As used in this chapter: 
(a) "Administer" means the direct application of a controlled substance, 
whether by injection, inhalation, ingestion, or any other means, to the 
body of a patient or research subject by: 
(i) a practitioner or, in his presence, by his authorized agent; or 
(ii) the patient or research subject at the direction and in the 
presence of the practitioner. 
(b) "Agent" means an authorized person who acts on behalf of or at the 
direction of a manufacturer, distributor, or practitioner but does not 
include a motor carrier, public warehouseman, or employee of any of them. 
(c) "Continuing criminal enterprise" means any individual, sole propri-
etorship, partnership, corporation, business trust, association, or other 
legal entity, and any union or groups of individuals associated in fact 
although not a legal entity, and includes illicit as well as licit entities 
created or maintained for the purpose of engaging in conduct which 
constitutes the commission of episodes of activity made unlawful by Title 
58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d, which episodes are not isolated, but 
have the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, methods 
of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing character-
istics. Taken together, the episodes shall demonstrate continuing unlawful 
conduct and be related either to each other or to the enterprise. 
(d) "Control" means to add, remove, or change the placement of a drug, 
substance, or immediate precursor under Section 58-37-3. 
(e) (i) "Controlled substance" means a drug or substance included in 
Schedules I, II, III, IV, or V of Section 58-37-4, and also includes a 
drug or substance included in Schedules I, II, III, IV, or V of the 
federal Controlled Substances Act, Title II, P.L. 91-513, or any 
controlled substance analog. 
(ii) "Controlled substance" does not include: 
(A) distilled spirits, wine, or malt beverages, as those terms 
are defined or used in Title 32A, regarding tobacco or food; 
(B) any drug intended for lawful use in the diagnosis, cure, 
mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in man or other 
animals, which contains ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, norpseudo-
ephedrine, or phenylpropanolamine if the drug is lawfully pur-
chased, sold, transferred, or furnished as an over-the-counter 
medication without prescription; or 
(C) dietary supplements, vitamins, minerals, herbs, or other 
similar substances including concentrates or extracts, which are 
not otherwise regulated by law, which may contain naturally 
occurring amounts of chemical or substances listed in this chap-
ter, or in rules adopted pursuant to Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah 
Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
(f) (i) "Controlled substance analog" means a substance the chemical 
structure of which is substantially similar to the chemical structure of 
a controlled substance listed in Schedules I and II of Section 58-37-4, 
or in Schedules I and II of the federal Controlled Substances Act, Title 
II, P.L. 91-513: 
(A) which has a stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect 
on the central nervous system substantially similar to the stim-
ulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous 
system of controlled substances in the schedules set forth in this 
subsection; or 
(B) which, with respect to a particular individual, is repre-
sented or intended to have a stimulant, depressant, or hallucino-
genic effect on the central nervous system substantially similar to 
the stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central 
nervous system of controlled substances in the schedules set forth 
in this subsection, 
(ii) Controlled substance analog does not include: 
(A) a controlled substance currently scheduled in Schedules I 
through V of Section 58-37-4; 
(B) a substance for which there is an approved new drug 
application; 
(C) a substance with respect to which an exemption is in effect 
for investigational use by a particular person under Section 505 of 
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. 366, to the extent the 
conduct with respect to the substance is permitted by the exemp-
tion; or 
(D) any substance to the extent not intended for h u m a n 
consumption before an exemption takes effect with respect to the 
substance. 
(E) Any drug intended for lawful use in the diagnosis, cure, 
mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in man or other 
animals, which contains ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, norpseudo-
ephedrine, or phenylpropanolamine if the drug is lawfully pur-
chased, sold, transferred, or furnished as an over-the-counter 
medication without prescription. 
(F) Dietary supplements, vitamins, minerals, herbs, or other 
similar substances including concentrates or extracts, which are 
not otherwise regulated by law, which may contain naturally 
occurring amounts of chemical or substances listed in this chap-
ter, or in rules adopted pursuant to Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah 
Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
(g) "Conviction" means a determination of guilt by verdict, whether jury 
or bench, or plea, whether guilty or no contest, for any offense proscribed 
by Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d, or for any offense under the 
laws of the United States and any other state which, if committed in this 
state, would be an offense under Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 
37d. 
(h) "Counterfeit substance" means: 
(i) any substance or container or labeling of any substance tha t 
without authorization bears the trademark, t rade name, or other 
identifying mark, imprint, number, device, or any likeness of them, of 
a manufacturer, distributor, or dispenser other than the person or 
persons who in fact manufactured, distributed, or dispensed the 
substance which falsely purports to be a controlled substance distrib-
uted by, any other manufacturer, distributor, or dispenser; or 
(ii) any substance that is represented to be a controlled substance, 
(i) "Deliver" or "delivery" means the actual, constructive, or attempted 
transfer of a controlled substance or a listed chemical, whether or not an 
agency relationship exists, 
(j) "Department" means the Department of Commerce. 
(k) "Depressant or stimulant substance" means: 
(i) a drug which contains any quantity of: 
(A) barbituric acid or any of the salts of barbituric acid; or 
(B) any derivative of barbituric acid which has been designated 
by the Secretary of Agriculture as habit-forming under Section 
502 (d) of the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. 352 
(d); 
(ii) a drug which contains any quantity of: 
(A) amphetamine or any of its optical isomers; 
(B) any salt of amphetamine or any salt of an optical isomer of 
amphetamine; or 
(C) any substance which the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services or the Attorney General of the United States after 
investigation has found and by regulation designated habit-
forming because of its stimulant effect on the central nervous 
system; or 
(hi) lysergic acid diethylamide; or 
(iv) any drug which contains any quantity of a substance which the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services or the Attorney General of 
the United States after investigation has found to have, and by 
regulation designated as having, a potential for abuse because of its 
depressant or stimulant effect on the central nervous system or its 
hallucinogenic effect. 
(1) "Dispense" means the delivery of a controlled substance by a phar-
macist to an ultimate user pursuant to the lawful order or prescription of 
a practitioner, and includes distributing to, leaving with, giving away, or 
disposing of that substance as well as the packaging, labeling, or com-
pounding necessary to prepare the substance for delivery. 
(m) "Dispenser" means a pharmacist who dispenses a controlled sub-
stance. 
(n) "Distribute" means to deliver other than by administering or dis-
pensing a controlled substance or a listed chemical. 
(o) "Distributor" means a person who distributes controlled substances, 
(p) "Drug" means: 
(i) articles recognized in the official United States Pharmacopoeia, 
Official Homeopathic Pharmacopoeia of the United States, or Official 
National Formulary, or any supplement to any of them; 
(ii) articles intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, 
treatment, or prevention of disease in man or other animals; 
(iii) articles, other than food, intended to affect the structure or 
function of man or other animals; and 
(iv) articles intended for use as a component of any articles speci-
fied in Subsection (i), (ii), or (iii); but does not include devices or their 
components, parts, or accessories, 
(q) "Drug dependent person" means any individual who unlawfully and 
habitually uses any controlled substance to endanger the public morals, 
health, safety, or welfare, or who is so dependent upon the use of controlled 
substances as to have lost the power of self-control with reference to his 
dependency. 
(r) "Food" means: 
(i) any nutrient or substance of plant, mineral, or animal origin 
other than a drug as specified in this chapter, and normally ingested 
by human beings; and 
(ii) foods for special dietary uses as exist by reason of a physical, 
physiological, pathological, or other condition including but not lim-
ited to the conditions of disease, convalescence, pregnancy, lactation, 
allergy, hypersensitivity to food, underweight, and overweight; uses 
for supplying a particular dietary need which exist by reason of age 
including but not limited to the ages of infancy and childbirth, and 
also uses for supplementing and for fortifying the ordinary or unusual 
diet with any vitamin, mineral, or other dietary property for use of a 
food. Any particular use of a food is a special dietary use regardless of 
the nutritional purposes. 
(s) "Immediate precursor" means a substance which the Attorney 
General of the United States has found to be, and by regulation designated 
as being, the principal compound used or produced primarily for use in the 
manufacture of a controlled substance, or which is an immediate chemical 
intermediary used or likely to be used in the manufacture of a controlled 
substance, the control of which is necessary to prevent, curtail, or limit the 
manufacture of the controlled substance. 
(t) "Manufacture" means the production, preparation, propagation, 
compounding, or processing of a controlled substance, either directly or 
indirectly by extraction from substances of natural origin, or indepen-
dently by means of chemical synthesis or by a combination of extraction 
and chemical synthesis. 
(u) "Manufacturer" includes any person who packages, repackages, or 
labels any container of any controlled substance, except pharmacists who 
dispense or compound prescription orders for delivery to the ult imate 
consumer. 
(v) "Marijuana" means all species of the genus cannabis and all par ts of 
the genus, whether growing or not; the seeds of it; the resin extracted from 
any part of the plant; and every compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, 
mixture, or preparation of the plant, its seeds, or resin. The term does not 
include the mature stalks of the plant, fiber produced from the stalks, oil 
or cake made from the seeds of the plant, any other compound, manufac-
ture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of the mature stalks, except 
the resin extracted from them, fiber, oil or cake, or the sterilized seed of the 
plant which is incapable of germination. Any synthetic equivalents of the 
substances contained in the plant cannabis sativa or any other species of 
the genus cannabis which are chemically indistinguishable and pharma-
cologically active are also included. 
(w) "Money means officially issued coin and currency of the United 
States or any foreign country. 
(x) "Narcotic drug" means any of the following, whether produced 
directly or indirectly by extraction from substances of vegetable origin, or 
independently by means of chemical synthesis, or by a combination of 
extraction and chemical synthesis: 
(i) opium, coca leaves, and opiates; 
(ii) a compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, or preparation of 
opium, coca leaves, or opiates; 
(iii) opium poppy and poppy straw; or 
(iv) a substance, and any compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, 
or preparation of the substance, which is chemically identical with 
any of the substances referred to in Subsection (i), (ii), or (iii), except 
narcotic drug does not include decocainized coca leaves or extracts of 
coca leaves which do not contain cocaine or ecgonine. 
(y) "Negotiable instrument" means documents, containing an uncondi-
tional promise to pay a sum of money, which are legally transferable to 
another party by endorsement or delivery. 
(z) "Opiate" means any drug or other substance having an addiction-
forming or addiction-sustaining liability similar to morphine or being 
capable of conversion into a drug having addiction-forming or addiction-
sustaining liability. 
(aa) "Opium poppy" means the plant of the species papaver somniferum 
L., except the seeds of the plant. 
(bb) "Person" means any corporation, association, partnership, trust, 
other institution or entity or one or more individuals. 
(cc) "Poppy straw" means all parts, except the seeds, of the opium 
poppy, after mowing. 
(dd) "Possession" or "use" means the joint or individual ownership, 
control, occupancy, holding, retaining, belonging, maintaining, or the 
application, inhalation, swallowing, injection, or consumption, as distin-
guished from distribution, of controlled substances and includes individ-
ual, joint, or group possession or use of controlled substances. For a person 
to be a possessor or user of a controlled substance, it is not required that 
he be shown to have individually possessed, used, or controlled the 
substance, but it is sufficient if it is shown that the person jointly 
participated with one or more persons in the use, possession, or control of 
any substances with knowledge that the activity was occurring, or the 
controlled substance is found in a place or under circumstances indicating 
that the person had the ability and the intent to exercise dominion and 
control over it. 
(ee) "Practitioner" means a physician, dentist, veterinarian, pharma-
cist, scientific investigator, pharmacy, hospital, or other person licensed, 
registered, or otherwise permitted to distribute, dispense, conduct re-
search with respect to, administer, or use in teaching or chemical analysis 
a controlled substance in the course of professional practice or research in 
this state. 
(fif) "Prescribe" means to issue a prescription orally or in writing. 
(gg) "Prescription" means an order issued by a licensed practitioner, in 
the course of that practitioner's professional practice, for a controlled 
substance, other drug, or device which it dispenses or administers for use 
by a patient or an animal. The order may be issued by word of mouth, 
written document, telephone, facsimile transmission, computer, or other 
electronic means of communication as defined by rule. 
(hh) "Production" means the manufacture, planting, cultivation, grow-
ing, or harvesting of a controlled substance. 
(ii) "Securities" means any stocks, bonds, notes, or other evidences of 
debt or of property. 
(jj) "State" means the state of Utah. 
(kk) "Ultimate user" means any person who lawfully possesses a 
controlled substance for his own use, for the use of a member of his 
household, or for administration to an animal owned by him or a member 
of his household. 
(2) If a term used in this chapter is not defined, the definition and terms of 
Title 76, Utah Criminal Code, shall apply. 
58-37d-3. Definitions. 
(1) As used in this chapter: 
(a) "Booby trap" means any concealed or camouflaged device designed to 
cause bodily injury when triggered by any action of a person making 
contact with the device. This term includes guns, ammunition, or explo-
sive devices attached to trip wires or other triggering mechanisms,-
sharpened stakes, nails, spikes, electrical devices, lines or wires with 
hooks attached, and devices for the production of toxic fumes or gases. 
(b) "Clandestine laboratory operation" means the: 
(i) purchase or procurement of chemicals, supplies, equipment, or 
laboratory location for the illegal manufacture of the above specified 
controlled substances specified in this act; 
(ii) transportation or arranging for the transportation of chemicals, 
supplies, or equipment for the illegal manufacture of specified con-
trolled substances specified in this act; 
(iii) setting up of equipment or supplies in preparation for the 
illegal manufacture of the above specified controlled substances 
specified in this act; 
(iv) illegal manufacture of the above specified controlled sub-
stances specified in this act; or 
(v) distribution or disposal of chemicals, equipment, supplies, or 
products used in or produced by the illegal manufacture of specified 
controlled substances specified in this act. 
(c) "Controlled substance precursor" means those chemicals designated 
in Title 58, Chapter 37c, Controlled Substance Precursor Act, except those 
substances designated in Subsections 58-37c-3(2)(kk) and (11). 
(d) "Disposal" means the abandonment, discharge, deposit, injection, 
dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of any hazardous or dangerous 
material into or on any property, land or water so that the material may 
enter the environment, be emitted into the air, or discharged into any 
waters, including groundwater. 
(e) "Hazardous or dangerous material" means any substance which 
because of its quantity, concentration, physical characteristics, or chemical 
characteristics may cause or significantly contribute to an increase in 
mortality, an increase in serious illness, or may pose a substantial present 
or potential future hazard to human health or the environment when 
improperly treated, stored, transported, disposed of, or otherwise improp-
erly managed. 
(f) "Illegal manufacture of specified controlled substances" means in 
violation of Title 58, Chapter 37, Utah Controlled Substances Act, the: 
(i) compounding, synthesis, concentration, purification, separation, 
extraction, or other physical or chemical processing for the purpose of 
producing methamphetamine, other amphetamine compounds as 
listed in Schedule I of the Utah Controlled Substances Act, phency-
clidine, narcotic analgesic analogs as listed in Schedule I of the Utah 
Controlled Substances Act, lysergic acid diethylamide, mescaline; 
(ii) conversion of cocaine or methamphetamine to their base forms; 
or 
(iii) extraction, concentration, or synthesis of marijuana as tha t 
drug is defined in Section 58-37-2. 
(2) Unless otherwise specified, the definitions in Section 58-37-2 also apply 
to this chapter. 
58-37d-4. Prohibited acts — Second degree felony. 
(1) It is unlawful for any person to knowingly or intentionally: 
(a) possess a controlled substance precursor with the intent to engage 
in a clandestine laboratory operation; 
(b) possess laboratory equipment or supplies with the intent to engage 
in a clandestine laboratory operation; 
(c) sell, distribute, or otherwise supply a precursor chemical, laboratory 
equipment, or laboratory supplies knowing or having reasonable cause to 
believe it will be used for a clandestine laboratory operation; 
(d) evade recordkeeping provisions of Title 58, Chapter 37c, Controlled 
Substances Precursor Act, or the regulations issued under tha t act, 
knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that the material distrib-
uted or received will be used for a clandestine laboratory operation; 
(e) conspire with or aid another to engage in a clandestine laboratory 
operation; 
(f) produce or manufacture, or possess with intent to produce or 
manufacture a controlled or counterfeit substance except as authorized 
under Title 58, Chapter 37, Utah Controlled Substances Act; or 
(g) transport or convey a controlled or counterfeit substance with the 
intent to distribute or to be distributed by the person transporting or 
conveying the controlled or counterfeit substance or by any other person 
regardless of whether the final destination for the distribution is within 
this state or any other location. 
(2) A person who violates any provision of Subsection (1) is guilty of a second 
degree felony. 
58-37d-5. Prohibited acts — First degree felony. 
(1) A person who violates Subsection 58-37d-4(l)(a), (b), (e), or (f) is guilty of 
a first degree felony if the trier of fact also finds any one of the following 
conditions occurred in conjunction with that violation: 
(a) possession of a firearm; 
(b) use of a booby trap; 
(c) illegal possession, transportation, or disposal of hazardous or dan-
gerous material or while transporting or causing to be transported 
materials in furtherance of a clandestine laboratory operation, there was 
created a substantial risk to human health or safety or a danger to the 
environment; 
(d) intended laboratory operation was to take place or did take place 
within 500 feet of a residence, place of business, church, or school; 
(e) clandestine laboratory operation actually produced any amount of a 
specified controlled substance; or 
(f) intended clandestine laboratory operation was for the production of 
cocaine base or methamphetamine base. 
(2) If the trier of fact finds that two or more of the conditions listed in 
Subsections (l)(a) through (f) of this section occurred in conjunction with the 
violation, at sentencing for the first degree felony: 
(a) probation shall not be granted; 
(b) the execution or imposition of sentence shall not be suspended; and 
(c) the court shall not enter a judgment for a lower category of offense. 
58-37d-6. Legal inference of intent — Illegal possession of 
a controlled substance precursor or clandestine 
laboratory equipment. 
The trier of fact may infer that the defendant intended to engage in a 
clandestine laboratory operation if the defendant: 
(1) is in illegal possession of a controlled substance precursor; or 
(2) illegally possesses or attempts to illegally possess a controlled 
substance precursor and is in possession of any one of the following pieces 
of equipment: 
(a) glass reaction vessel; 
(b) separatory funnel; 
(c) glass condenser; 
(d) analytical balance; or 
(e) heating mantle. 
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BILLINGS. 
*1 Defendant appeals his murder conviction. We 
affirm. 
Defendant first argues the trial court erred in failing 
to grant a new trial based on newly discovered 
evidence. M[W]e review the decision to grant or 
deny a motion for a new trial only for abuse of 
discretion." State v. Loose, 2000 UT 11, Tf 8, 994 
P.2d 1237. To be afforded a new trial based on 
newly discovered evidence, defendant "must 
demonstrate from the p roffered evidence t hat: ' (i) i t 
could not, with reasonable diligence, have been 
discovered and produced at trial; (ii) it is not merely 
cumulative; and (iii) it must make a different r esult 
probable on retrial.' " Id. at K 16 (quoting State v. 
Martin, 1999 UT 72, \ 5, 984 P.2d 975). 
First, defendant claims to have discovered new 
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evidence of the victim's gang membership. The trial 
court determined that even had the tattoos allegedly 
identifying the victim as a gang member been 
discovered and disclosed prior to trial, the jury's 
verdict would not have been different. We agree. 
The defendant himself testified regarding the 
violent, well-organized groups of Hispanic drug 
dealers who controlled the drug trade in the park. 
Other witnesses testified that the drug dealers 
worked in groups and carried weapons, and that 
they engaged in violence to protect their territory. 
Further, there is no evidence that the defendant was 
aware of either the tattoos or the particular gang 
affiliation they represented at the time of the 
homicide and thus this evidence was not particularly 
probative of his state of mind. We therefore agree 
with the trial court that evidence of the tattoos 
would not have made a different result probable. 
Defendant also claims to have uncovered additional 
eyewitness testimony. The trial court found Julian 
Valdez's testimony cumulative, lacking in 
credibility, and to be of little material value to 
defendant because much of it supported the State's 
case. The court found the alleged statements of 
Gilmar Pinelo to be inadmissible hearsay. While 
Valdez did testify regarding the victim's violence, 
that evidence is merely cumulative of other 
evidence presented at trial. See Loose, 2000 UT 11 
at U 16. Thus, it was not an abuse of discretion to 
refuse to grant a new trial based on the proffered 
testimony of Valdez and Pinelo. 
Defendant also claims new evidence exists that the 
State waived payment of an additional $300 fine 
resulting from a DUI c harge against witness R obert 
Young in exchange for Young's testimony. We 
agree with the trial court that the presentation of 
Young's failure to pay the fine would not have made 
a different result probable on retrial. 
Next, defendant argues the trial court erred in not 
instructing the jury on the lesser-included offense of 
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manslaughter. Although defendant claims he 
submitted a requested instruction on manslaughter, 
our review of the record has uncovered no such 
request. The trial court found that defendant would 
have been entitled to the instruction if he had 
requested it, but he did not. Moreover, the trial 
court found, and our review of the record confirms, 
that his attorneys made no objection to the 
instructions as given. "Where no grounds are 
apparent from the text of the instruction and no 
objection is stated, the objection is presumed 
waived." State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201, 1203 
(Utah Ct.App.1991). However, "error may be 
assigned to instructions in order to avoid a manifest 
injustice." Utah R.Crim.P. 19(c); see State v. 
Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688, 700 (Utah Ct.App.1995) 
(stating that "[b]ecause defendant failed to object to 
the instruction at trial, we can reach the issue only 
to avoid manifest injustice"); cf. State v. Rudolph, 
970 P.2d 1221, 1226 (Utah 1998) (stating that 
M[w]hen reviewing a claim of manifest injustice, we 
generally use the same standard that is applied to 
determine whether plain error exists"). 
*2 In this case the record indicates that defendant 
considered requesting a manslaughter instruction, 
but decided against it. The trial court found this to 
be "appropriate trial tactics, and a reasonable 
gamble." 
Because we agree with the trial court that the 
failure to request the manslaughter instruction was 
deliberate trial strategy, rather than egregious 
oversight, we conclude defendant has not 
demonstrated obvious error or manifest injustice. It 
is long settled that a defendant has a choice whether 
to seek a lesser-included instruction, and the court 
has no independent duty to give such an instruction 
if not requested. See State v. Howell, 649 P.2d 91, 
94 (Utah 1992); State v. Mitchell, 278 P.2d 618, 
621 (Utah 1955). Indeed, were we to find this 
strategic choice to fall under the plain error or 
manifest injustice doctrines, defendants in all cases 
could gamble that the jury would acquit, then 
appeal the failure to instruct as a manifest injustice 
should they lose. See Howell, 649 P .2d at 94; State 
v. Valdez, 432 P.2d 53, 54 (Utah 1967) (noting that 
"[hjaving made his choice, [defendant] is bound by 
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it; and he cannot thus elect to make no request as to 
a lesser included offense, with a reservation in mind 
that if he is convicted he can claim error and obtain 
a new trial"). Accordingly, the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in refusing to grant a new trial 
based on the failure to give a manslaughter 
instruction. 
Third, defendant claims his trial counsel provided 
ineffective assistance because counsel failed to fully 
investigate the victim's gang involvement, the 
additional eyewitness testimony, and the alleged 
leniency to witness Young. To prevail on this claim, 
defendant "must show that his counsel's 
representation fell below an objective standard of 
reasonable conduct and that he was prejudiced 
thereby." Bruner v. Carver, 920 P.2d 1153, 1157 
(Utah Ct.App.1996). Because we have determined 
that defendant would not have obtained a more 
favorable result in a new trial including this 
evidence, we conclude defendant was not 
prejudiced by trial counsel's treatment of these 
issues. 
Defendant also claims ineffective assistance of 
counsel due to counsel's failure to request a 
lesser-included offense instruction on manslaughter. 
As discussed above, this failure to request the 
instruction was a reasonable trial strategy and does 
not constitute ineffective assistance. See State v. 
Perry, 899 P.2d 1232, 1241 (Utah Ct.App.1995). 
Similarly, counsel's failure to present mitigating 
evidence of defendant's possible mental illness was 
a reasonable strategy given the defense theory of 
self-defense. See id. 
Next, defendant claims the State failed to provide 
him with exculpatory evidence, resulting in a 
violation of due process. Defendant must show that 
the prosecutor failed to disclose evidence favorable 
to the defense and that there is "a 'reasonable 
probability' that the result ... would have been 
different if the evidence had been disclosed." State 
v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, If 39, 979 P.2d 799 
(quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U .S. 667, 
682 (1985)). However, we have determined above 
that even had this evidence been presented, a 
different result on retrial would not be probable. 
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Therefore, defendant has failed to show his due 
process rights were violated. 
*3 Finally, defendant claims there was insufficient 
evidence of his intent to kill the victim. To prevail 
in his challenge, defendant "must first marshal all 
the evidence supporting the ... verdict and then 
demonstrate how this evidence, even viewed in the 
most favorable light, is insufficient to support the 
verdict." State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 819 (Utah 
Ct.App.1994). Defendant has failed to meet his 
burden to marshal the evidence and instead recites 
only selected evidence supporting his theory of 
self-defense. Thus, we need not consider whether 
the evidence was insufficient. See State v. Hopkins, 
1999 UT 98, H 16, 989 P.2d 1065. Moreover, our 
independent review of the record indicates that the 
jury did hear sufficient evidence upon which to base 
its guilty verdict. For example, witnesses testified 
that defendant retrieved his knife from storage on 
the morning of the stabbing in order to take care of 
a "problem" and that when defendant raised the 
knife after being hit by the victim, the victim 
backed away with his empty hands raised while 
defendant t ook se veral s teps forward t o s tab h im i n 
the chest. This evidence is sufficient to support the 
verdict; therefore, defendant's challenge to the 
sufficiency of the evidence fails. 
Accordingly, we affirm defendant's conviction. 
GREENWOOD P J., and ORME, J, concur. 
Not Reported in P.3d, 2000 WL 33250560 (Utah 
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